

Security Council Study Guide: Stabilizing the Middle East

I. Security Council Overview

The Security Council is one of the central organs of the United Nations Organization. Its mandate under the UN Charter is to veil for the safeguarding of international security. It intervenes whenever a threat to peace arises, and is able to do so through a variety of means.

According to the UN Charter, all Member States “shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council“ that are deemed to preserve or restore peace (cf. Chapter VII of the UN Charter). This means that while other agencies and committees may only issue suggestions or recommendations to Member States, the Security Council is the only UN-body able to issue resolutions that are legally binding upon them.¹

The Security Council is composed of 5 Permanent (“P5”) and 10 Non-Permanent Members. According to the UN Charter, the 5 Permanent Members have veto-power in any substantial matter voted upon by the Security Council (cf. Article 27 of the UN Charter). Therefore, every resolution should count with the approval of each one of them. The Permanent Members are:

- the People’s Republic of China,
- the Russian Federation,
- the French Republic,
- the United States of America.
- the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Non-Permanent Members are elected by the General Assembly for a two-year-period. They do not possess veto-power, but can still actively influence the work of the committee. The Non-Permanent Members in 2016 are:

- The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
- Malaysia,
- New Zealand,
- Arab Republic of Egypt,
- Eastern Republic of Uruguay,
- Japan,
- Ukraine,
- the Kingdom of Spain,
- Republic of Senegal, and
- the Republic of Angola.

¹ <http://www.un.org/en/sc/>; accessed 12/20/15.



At Heidelberg National MUN 2016, given the nature of the topic the Security Council will be handling, and in accordance with Article 32 of the UN Charter, the committee will welcome five member states plus the EU representative involved in the matter, which will act as observers during the conference. They have a right to address the committee, and to vote on procedural matters. They are, however, unable to participate in substantial decisions. These entities are:

- The European Union,
- Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
- Syrian Arab Republic, and
- Republic of Turkey,
- Lebanese Republic,
- Republic of Iraq.

II. Topic Overview

Most certainly, Syria is the central variable of the conflict in the Middle East today, but it is not the only variable that needs to be taken into account in order to bring peace to the region. Of course, the major influx of refugees is coming from Syria. Consequently it is necessary to end the conflict in Syria and improve the overall situation there, but while the whole world is occupied discussing a Syria-centrist discourse, it is of utmost importance not to lose sight of the big picture.

The big picture is central in order to bring peace to this war-shaken region, as solving the Syrian conflict will not do any good, when the whole region collapses in the process. Especially neighboring countries, like the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as well as the Lebanon, are aching under the immense pressure put on them by myriads of refugees and the hostile environment surrounding them. Therefore, the Security Council needs to address specific measures that have to be taken in order to stabilize and relieve the region. It is indeed correct when the media declares: The situation in the Middle East is bad, but the current situation is nothing compared to what the world would face if Jordan and the Lebanon would collapse. This Study Guide will give you a rough overview of the refugee situation in the different countries of the region, with a focus on the perspective of UN bodies, such as UNHCR.

III. Syria

With no political solution in sight, and military confrontation continuing, the number of people affected by internal conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) is likely to increase in the years to come. The likely ongoing destruction of infrastructure, along with shifting conflict lines and high levels of insecurity and violence, continue to restrict humanitarian access. The delivery of basic services in many parts of the country has also been affected, reducing or severely damaging Syrians' livelihoods. The scale of destruction of homes and livelihoods presents a major obstacle to return and reintegration efforts.²

Under the inter-agency framework of the Syrian Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP), the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) pledges to strive to deliver its programmes to people of concern irrespective of their location, including through cross-line and cross-border

² <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/txis/vtx/page?page=49e486a76&submit=GO> ; accessed 12/20/15.



activities. It takes a lead role in the protection, shelter and non-food item (NFI) sectors, also using its experience and expertise in the health, education and livelihoods sectors.³

Nevertheless, the numbers of refugees are devastating, especially the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). After UN estimations, 6.5 Million Syrians are considered to be internally displaced, and despite the fact that the country is in state of civil war, they still host refugees and asylum seekers from other countries, most of them coming from the neighboring countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, but also Somalian refugees.⁴

In order to put numbers on it: UNHCR's financial requirements for Syria increased from USD 116.9 million in 2011 to USD 320.2 million in 2014, this means it roughly tripled within a period of 3 years. The refugee programme budget fell from USD 114 million to USD 64.3 million, and IDP projects started in 2012 with USD 41.7 million budget to USD 309.8 million by mid of 2014. The goal of this great fund of the IDP projects can be explained by the approach that the international community tries to keep as many Syrians in Syria as possible.

IV. Jordan

The operational environment in Jordan continues to be considerably affected by the security situation in the neighboring Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) and the influx of Syrians into the country, as well as by developments in Iraq and Gaza in 2014.

The country provides asylum for a large number of refugees, including from Syria and Iraq. It has granted Syrian refugees access to services, such as health and education, in host communities. The Syrian refugee camps of Azraq and Zaatari were built on land provided by the authorities where they also ensure security.⁵ Jordan continues to demonstrate hospitality, despite the substantial strain on national systems and infrastructure. In 2014, the Government published the National Resilience Plan 2014-2016, presenting "proposed priority responses to mitigate the impact of the Syrian crisis on Jordan and Jordanian host communities." The authorities' active engagement will likely influence the UNHCR-coordinated inter-agency refugee response.⁶

Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Nonetheless, the Government refers to Syrians as refugees, and the protection space is generally favorable, although fragile owing to the country's own socio-economic challenges. The 1998 memorandum of understanding (MoU) between UNHCR and the Government, partially amended in 2014, forms the basis for the Office's activities in Jordan. In the absence of any international or national legal refugee instruments in force in the country, the MoU establishes the parameters for cooperation between UNHCR and the Government.⁷

Syrians fleeing the ongoing violence in their country still constitute the majority of Jordan's refugee population, although large-scale arrivals witnessed in the first half of 2013 have since dropped significantly, due in part to the difficulty of getting to Jordan through disputed territories along the southern Syria border. Approximately 20 per cent of Syrian refugees reside in refugee camps, while the remaining live in non-camp settings.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486566&submit=GO>; accessed 12/20/15.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.



As of 31 July, nearly 30,000 Iraqis were registered with UNHCR in Jordan, the majority from Baghdad. Third-country resettlement is expected to remain the primary durable solution for Iraqis in 2015 with approximately 1,500 departures. While the security conditions in Iraq explain the lack of interest in voluntary return, assistance and services are often insufficient to meet the needs of those refugees who remain in Jordan. As of 31 July, over 5,000 refugees and asylum-seekers who were not of Syrian or Iraqi origin were registered: the majority are Somali and Sudanese, including many who have been in Jordan for an extended period of time. UNHCR conducts individual refugee status determination (RSD) for all non-Syrian asylum-seekers.⁸ Most recently, the Jordanian Government deported 800 UN-recognized refugees and asylum seekers back to Sudan, against the warnings of UNHCR that the deportees will be put in harm's way through these actions.⁹

The United Nations foremost priority remains to ensure that Jordan's largely favorable protection environment is maintained in the coming years, despite new arrivals of Syrians potentially further straining already limited resources. This could have a negative impact on Jordanian public opinion of refugees, and make preserving the country's asylum space in the country challenging.

The financial requirements for UNHCR's Jordan operation have increased dramatically, from USD 62.8 million in 2010 to a revised 2015 budget of USD 404.4 million, due to the needs arising from the Syria emergency.

V. Lebanon

The impact of the Syrian crisis - including on the economy, demographics, political instability, and security - continues to deepen across Lebanon. With more than 1.8 million refugees residing in the small country, Lebanon's exceptional hospitality is extremely stretched.

The Government has established an inter-ministerial crisis cell, confirming its pro-active engagement in refugee issues. While the country is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and despite restrictions imposed at the border, it is expected that Syrians in need of immediate protection and assistance will continue to find safe haven in Lebanon. Refugees have access to most basic services through public institutions, where the authorities continue to play an active role in facilitating response coordination and planning. Syrian refugees, like the Lebanese in local communities most affected by the influx, are becoming increasingly vulnerable, despite the large-scale inter-agency response to date. Humanitarian needs show little signs of abating. As their displacement extends and their savings deplete, refugees' socio-economic vulnerability increases.¹⁰

An effective display of international solidarity and support is vital for Lebanon, which has received the highest number of Syrian refugees in the world. Failing this, the country's capacity to respond and withstand the Syria crisis will be severely tested.¹¹

Syrians fleeing conflict continue to make up the majority of refugees in Lebanon. According to current projections, there will be over 1.3 million registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon at the start of 2015.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/jordan-has-begun-deporting-sudanese-asylum-seekers/2015/12/18/bffb1514-a56b-11e5-8318-bd8caed8c588_story.html; accessed 12/20/15.

¹⁰ <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/txis/vtx/page?page=49e486676&submit=GO>; accessed 12/20/15.

¹¹ Ibid.



Asylum-seekers from Iraq continue to make up the majority of new registrations among non-Syrians. Developments in Iraq have led to a significant increase in registration requests since June 2014.

It is estimated that there are tens of thousands of stateless people in Lebanon. Syrian refugees born in Lebanon are particularly at risk. A 2014 survey of 5,779 Syrian newborns found that 72 per cent do not possess an official birth certificate, raising concerns over the recognition of their nationality by the Syrian authorities.¹²

The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) is the main forum for partners to plan, coordinate and report on the refugee response. UNHCR and UNDP are supporting the Government in leading the refugee and resilience components, respectively.¹³

The financial requirements for UNHCR's operation in Lebanon continue to increase, in line with population trends and greater vulnerabilities resulting largely from the Syrian refugee influx: from USD 13.7 million in 2011 to a revised budget of USD 556.8 million in 2015.¹⁴

VI. Iraq

The escalation of armed conflict across the central governorates of Iraq, and the constantly changing security situation, have resulted in new and secondary movements of internally displaced people (IDPs) across central Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I).

UNHCR's access to some IDP and refugee locations (particularly in central Iraq), as well as the ability of IDPs and refugees to transit through certain areas of Iraq, is still restricted. Newly displaced people in Iraq find their limited financial resources quickly depleted by the increasing costs of accommodation and basic foods. The number of Iraqis seeking refuge in other countries is rising considerably; however, it is anticipated that the Syrian refugee population currently in Iraq will probably remain at a similar level or increase slightly, depending on developments in the north-eastern part of the Syrian Arab Republic.¹⁵

The central Government and KR-I authorities have contributed to the IDP and Syrian refugee response with: registration, core relief item (CRI) distribution, cash assistance, essential services in collective centres, and land allocation and site preparation for camps.

The main groups of people of concern assisted in 2015 are: refugees and asylum-seekers of mostly Syrian, Palestinian, Iranian and Turkish origin, located in camps, settlements and urban areas across the country, essentially in the KR-I, but also in Baghdad and other central governorates; over 1 million IDPs already displaced in the country before the new upsurge in violence in 2014, and many others forcibly displaced - some forced to move multiple times - within the country since mid-2014; returnees (mainly to Baghdad governorate), most of whom are coming back from Syria; tens of thousands of people, mainly Faili Kurds and Bidoon, thought to be stateless in Iraq, whose situation is difficult to assess given current access limitations. In addition, since February 2012, the UNHCR has been working to identify individuals with international protection needs and to find solutions outside Iraq for the remaining population (2,746 individuals) of the Hurriya Temporary Transit Location (formerly Ashraf Camp) residents.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/the-3rp/strategic-overview/>; accessed 12/20/15.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486426&submit=GO>; accessed 12/20/15.



The Iraq operations' revised 2013 budget amounted to USD 293.7 million, in light of the growing needs of Syrian refugees. In 2014, the ExCom-approved budget was set at USD 216 million, a drop from 2013 that reflected less shelter construction for IDPs and refugee returnees. However, the onset of armed conflict in Anbar in early 2014 and the further escalation in violence across central Iraq since the middle of the year, also affecting the KR-I, saw the UNHCR launch a supplementary appeal, increasing the total requirements for 2014 for Iraq to well over half a billion USD. UNHCR Iraq's approved 2015 comprehensive budget stood at USD 230.5 million.

VII. Egypt

Egypt is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 OAU Convention. Nevertheless, as the country has not yet developed national asylum procedures and institutions, UNHCR carries out the functional responsibilities for all aspects of registration, documentation and refugee status determination (RSD) under the 1954 memorandum of understanding with the Government of Egypt.¹⁶

Continuing instability in Egypt has affected the protection environment for refugees and asylum-seekers and is likely to continue in the coming year, with increased reliance on UNHCR for assistance programmes and protection interventions, including for legal residency and against arbitrary arrest, deportation and harassment.¹⁷

While the Government grants some access to public primary health care and education, specialized public care for chronic illnesses and rehabilitative interventions is not available to people of concern, nor are various national public insurance schemes. The absorption capacity in state schools remains an issue due to overcrowding and teacher shortages.¹⁸ In a strained political and socioeconomic environment, where refugees and asylum-seekers are finding it difficult to make ends meet, Egypt is likely to see a growing number taking risks to reach Europe via sea, through smuggling and trafficking networks. An increasing number of asylum-seekers from South Sudan and Sudan have already been registered by UNHCR in Egypt.¹⁹

The Office has reached an agreement with the Egyptian authorities on the transfer of several hundred refugees and asylum-seekers from Salloum Camp (near the Egyptian-Libyan border) to Cairo, pending departure for resettlement or other durable solutions.

In 2015, the main groups of people of concern to UNHCR are refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) and other refugees and asylum-seekers in urban areas, including: Sudanese who escaped violence in various regions of Sudan; South Sudanese fleeing the latest internal conflict that began in December 2013, as well as those who have been in Egypt for decades; Somali refugees who fled the security situation in their country; Eritrean refugees who sought asylum due to human rights abuses or forced conscription; Ethiopian refugees who have fled political persecution; and Iraqi refugees.²⁰

¹⁶ <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486356&submit=GO>; accessed 12/20/15.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.



VIII. Responses – Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)

The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) brings together the plans developed under the leadership of national authorities – namely, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Republic of Iraq, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Lebanese Republic, and the Republic of Turkey, to ensure protection, humanitarian assistance and to strengthen resilience. The 2016-2017 3RP brings together more than 200 partners in a coordinated, region-wide response to the Syria crisis. In 2016, the 3RP appeal is USD 5.78 billion for the total programmatic response of Governments, United Nations agencies, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This represents an overall increase of 10 per cent in the appeal compared to the corresponding 2015 figure, reflecting a rise in the number of refugees in the region, their increased vulnerabilities, an increase in host Government requirements, and a greater focus on service delivery through local and municipal systems to reduce duplication and build resilience.

Within the USD 5.78 billion programmatic requirements of the national plans, United Nations agencies, IGOs and NGO partners are appealing for up to USD 4.55 billion to support those national plans, an increase of 5 per cent compared to the revised 2015 appeal. This small increase reflects continued efforts to make the response more effective, targeted and efficient, including cash-based interventions to provide assistance for food and other basic needs such as rent and household items. Agencies are undertaking improved targeting of resources and assistance to the most vulnerable. After large investments in establishing camp infrastructure in Jordan and Iraq in recent years, the Shelter Sector is appealing for a reduced amount in 2016 as it moves towards a maintenance phase in camps. There are significant increases compared to 2015 in the Education Sector and in the Livelihoods and Social Cohesion sector, reflecting key strategic directions of the response in 2016-2017. Agencies aim to help the more than 700,000 out-of-school refugee children to access learning, as well as make significant investments to support the capacity of national systems to cope with the increased number of students. The increase in the Livelihoods and Social Cohesion Sector reflects a desire by 3RP partners to further policy change, offer life-skill and vocational training as well as support to small and medium initiatives that offer refugees and un- or under-employed nationals livelihood opportunities.

The requirements reflect an overall increase in the Resilience Component which is aimed at providing a more sustainable response. Of the USD 4.55 billion interagency appeal, USD 2.82 billion (62 per cent) is to address immediate protection and assistance needs within the Refugee Component, while USD 1.73 billion (38 per cent) is in support of the Resilience Component, including investments in livelihoods and support to national knowledge, capacities, and systems. This represents a greater share (38 per cent in 2016 versus 29 per cent in 2015) of resources in the Resilience Component. Some 4 million members of impacted host communities will be directly targeted for assistance under the 3RP in 2016. The 3RP partners emphasize and reiterate the importance of donors disbursing funds earlier in the year, and request multi-year funding to assist in better planning, predictability, and delivery of longer-term, resilience-based interventions. With this in mind, the total indicative requirements for the 2017 programmatic response of Governments, United Nations agencies, IGOs and NGOs is USD 2.99 billion (excluding Lebanon which does not have an indicative budget for 2017), although this will be subject to change in line with the evolving situation. The 3RP, with its linked refugee and resilience components, is



designed to encourage donors to support a new architecture of aid by significantly expanding and harmonizing funding allocations from their different funding streams.²¹

IX. Main Conflict Lines

A. Resources

One of the main conflict lines concerning refugees in the region is drawn by the overall scarcity of resources. Especially in countries like Jordan, the lack of water leads to tensions between the refugees and the local community. Jordan is under the five most water-scarce countries in the world.²² The country is in the unfortunate position of being located in the arid and politically divided Middle East, while lacking the access to valuable natural resources that its equally waterless neighbors enjoy. This means that it must rely heavily on its own natural water resources, namely the Dead Sea and the Jordan River. Increased desertification and a growing population are acting together to decimate the water supply, and a plan for alternate sources has not been formulated.²³ This means that there is a high risk that the Jordanian society is starting to see the refugees as a life-threatening competition and not as vulnerable victims of war, who need protection.

B. Security

Another big issue is the challenge of the security threat by posed by Da'esh and its sympathizers within the countries. On the one hand there is a risk of "importing" Da'esh-Terrorists with the high number of refugees streaming into neighboring countries, and on the other hand there is a risk of sympathizers from within the hosting societies as well. In the previous years, the host countries did their utmost to prevent attacks from such sympathizers, but eventually the sympathizers succeeded. In Lebanon, two suicide bombers on motorcycles killed at least 43 people, and wounded more than 200 others in a predominantly Shia area of southern Beirut in November.²⁴ Also, Egypt and Turkey have encountered lethal attacks claimed by Da'esh, and even though Jordan did not encounter such an attack yet, the probability and risk of such attacks is on the rise world-wide. This threat is causing problems within the host societies of refugees. They are already starting to perceive refugees from Iraq and Syria as a potential security threat and treat them accordingly. As a consequence, there is a risk of a conflict between refugees and host communities.

²¹ <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/the-3rp/strategic-overview/>; accessed 12/20/15.

²² Note: There is a difference between a country that has little water but enough resources to buy all it needs, and an undeveloped country that has neither. Gulf nations like Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait top the list in the ratio of available local resources per person, but these countries are capable of trading one precious liquid for another or financing desalination efforts.

²³ <http://www.seametrics.com/blog/5-countries-most-threatened-by-water-shortages/>; accessed 12/20/15.

²⁴ <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/isil-claims-suicide-bombings-southern-beirut-151112193802793.html>; accessed 12/20/15.



C. Working Sector

Furthermore, refugees are posing a serious threat to the local job markets, as they, desperate for the money, offer their services for a fraction of the cost of a local worker. This basically results in a mechanism of loan dumping on the local job market, and puts local daily workers at risk, who are also struggling to earn their daily bread. As already noted above, those kind of processes and mechanisms create serious tensions between refugees and their hosting societies, which need to be prevented in order to offer protection for refugees in the immediate environment of their home countries.

X. Former Resolutions

Resolution 2170²⁵, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, demanded the implementation of the following mechanisms:

1. Provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees including the delivery of relief items, logistics, and information management resources,
2. Suppression of the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of national citizens traveling to Iraq or Syria as jihadist fighters for ISIL (e.g. by airlines exchange passenger information data),
3. Prevention of the supply of military material to ISIL through national providers, including flag vessels or aircraft, arms and related materiel of all types; based on the arms embargo imposed by resolution 2161,
4. Prevention financial support to ISIL from UN members and their providers, including the prohibition of illicit oil purchases,
5. Long-term prevention of religious radicalization and extremism.

The resolution 2178²⁶, adopted on 24 September 2014, again acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, highlighted the urgency of the issue. It encouraged increased efforts by states to implement the measures suggested in previous resolutions, as well as better coordination and information sharing between member states (e.g. via Interpol). In addition, it added the demand for the development of prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters.

In an additional resolution 2191, adopted by the Security Council at its 7344th meeting on 17 December 2014, it recalls the resolutions 2042 (2012), 2043 (2012), 2118 (2013), 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2175 (2014), and its Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011 (S/PRST/2011/16), 21 March 2012 (S/PRST/2012/6), 5 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/10) and 2 October 2013 (S/PRST/2013/15), declaring, as stated in the UN Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014) and 2165 (2014), that the resolution aims to

²⁵ <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11520.doc.htm>; accessed 12/20/15.

²⁶ <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11580.doc.htm>; accessed 12/20/15.



improve access to affected populations, their Office will continue expanding its outreach capacity, including through more national partners. To this end, they decide that the UNHCR will maintain its eight field offices, to ensure a presence and access to the IDPs, as well as to maintain response and monitoring capacity.²⁷

XI. Elements of Discussion

Elements of the discussions during committee session should address the challenges the situation is posing on the neighboring countries of Syria and Iraq. The overarching goal of this session is to pass a resolution that secures, supports, and stabilizes surrounding countries of Syria and Iraq in order to prevent the chaos from spreading out and a worsening of the situation in the Middle East.

That goal could be achieved through multiple different ways, for example funds for the region could be increased interlinking these funds with certain goals and projects. Also, UN troops could be deployed in order to support the local armies in securing the borders and refugee camps. Furthermore, the Security Council could call upon other countries in the region to take on more responsibility through hosting more refugees, relieving Lebanon and Jordan from the heavy burden that weighs on their shoulders.

Another point that could be discussed is the prioritizing of refugees that is happening and the treatment of refugees, with a special focus on the many non-Syrian refugees in the region, to prevent deportations from happening.²⁸

The prevailing question should be:

How can the International Community effectively support relief and stabilize the region, in order to prevent a collapse from happening?

XII. Research Recommendations

Due to the actuality of the topic, research should be based on most recent reports. To gain more background information, you may make use of the numerous references of the study guide.

Further entry points are:

<http://www.aljazeera.com/>

<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home>

<http://www.un.org/en/sc/>

²⁷ <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2191>; accessed 12/20/15.

²⁸ See chapter IV in this Study Guide.



<http://www.theguardian.com/international>

<http://www.sueddeutsche.de/1.2755546>

* Please take into account that this Study Guide is just meant to serve as the entry point into your actual research. Its objective is not to provide an exhaustive analysis, but to give delegates some ground knowledge to carry out further research.

** This Study Guide was finished on the 20th of December 2015. Therefore, any events occurring after this date are not outlined here. Delegates should pay careful attention to the current development of the situation, and be prepared to adapt to any new events.